He also related that a group of the Karrāmiyyah affirmed a quiddity and a modality for Allah.

One might say:

If Abū al-Maʿālī held that Allah must possess an attribute which we cannot know at present, how can it rightly be said that we know all the attributes affirmed or denied of Him? And given that various groups affirm attributes of His that cannot be known, or allow for their existence, how can he report a Muslim consensus to the contrary? This is a contradiction between his writings.

One might reply:

He did not contradict himself, because what he ruled out by consensus was the positing of an attribute subject to inquiry concerning which certainty cannot be attained through either reason or revelation. Here, however, he is certain of what he affirms, rather than merely allowing for its possibility. Thus, there is no contradiction.

One might counter:

Rather, if a reality that cannot be known must be affirmed, there is nothing to preclude that reality from having an attribute that cannot be known. Categorically denying this while categorically affirming that reality is therefore a contradiction. Whether or not it is a contradiction, however, the falsity of his claimed consensus is apparent to anyone with even the slightest scholarly discernment. He is simply deeply immersed in the discourse of the Muʿtazilah and their followers, while having little knowledge of, or concern for, the discourse of the early generations, the leading scholars, and the other Muslim groups among the jurists, hadith scholars, Sufis, and the various schools of speculative theology as well. Thus he reported a consensus, just as speculative theologians of this kind report other such false consensuses. Even if the matter were as he claimed, his assertion that the evidence of the Quran and the transmitted reports on this matter