and possible in the way of enhanced intellectual capacities have, in our view, a limit at which it must stop. Nor does reason preclude an enhanced capacity which, were it to exist, would yield knowledge of the reality of the Divine Being.”

It has already been explained that this is the position of the leading scholars of his school, such as al-Qādī and others. Here he explicitly states that Allah has an attribute distinguishing Him from others which cannot be known through reason, whether spontaneously or through inquiry. He also explicitly affirms that we could know it if granted an enhanced capacity through which to do so.

He himself related that al-Ustādh Abū Ishāq said:

“The reality of the Divine Being is a complete attribute entailing His transcendence above any resemblance to originated beings.”

He also mentioned that al-Qādī Abū Bakr related Dirār’s position that Allah has a quiddity which, at present, none but He knows, and that al-Qādī said:

“I see nothing implausible in what Dirār said. The Lord differs from His creation by His most distinctive attribute. Thus, it is known in general terms that the Lord—glory be to Him—possesses a distinctive attribute by which He differs from His creation. This most distinctive attribute cannot be understood as existence or beginninglessness, and there is no doubt that it cannot be understood as referring to the real attributes.”

He also related that al-Qādī was undecided as to whether those who see Allah—glory be to Him—in the Hereafter will know that attribute, which he calls His most distinctive attribute and which Dirār called a quiddity.