pleased; and there are many similar examples.

His argument that, if laughter were possible for Him, weeping would also be possible for Him is of the same kind. He thus makes attributes of perfection entail their opposites among attributes of imperfection. It would then follow that, if He may be described as knowing, He may also be described as ignorant; if He may be described as possessing power, hearing, and sight, He may also be described as powerless, blind, and deaf; if He may be described as rejoicing, He may also be described as distressed and sorrowful; and if He may be described as living, He may also be described as dead—and likewise in other such cases.

His statement, “If He were one who laughs, this statement would be something to laugh at,” is likewise of the same kind as this interpretation. Is it conceivable to any rational mind that the Messenger should have reported more than once that Allah laughs at the things he mentioned, and should say, “I laughed at the laughter of the Lord of the worlds,” yet this laughter should have no existence, being instead nonexistent and impossible? If the Messenger could report that something exists when it does not, belief in his reports in general would be lost. This wording cannot bear such an interpretation in any way whatsoever.