cannot intend thereby to make his audience understand something contrary to the apparent meaning without any evidence. If, then, it is established that there is no evidence by which a meaning contrary to the apparent sense can be known, this is subject to the condition that the speaker is wise and intends to explain and impart understanding. If, however, his intention is to deceive and confuse, or he is ignorant, he may address people in words from which they understand something other than what he intends, or direct them without evidence. Yet there is agreement that none of this applies to Allah and His Messenger.

The eighth argument: If it is established that what you call rational arguments cannot settle their disputes or distinguish for them truth from falsehood in these reinterpretations—and Allah, glorified be He, has established His proof against His servants and made clear that He would not lead them astray until He had explained to them what they must guard against—then it follows that what settles the dispute and distinguishes truth from falsehood must be something other than these grounds which they call rational arguments. Nor can it be the imaginings to which some people claim privileged access and which they call “unveilings,” or the pursuit of desires which they call “spiritual tastes”