and the hand, or accidents, such as knowledge and power. If those who affirm the divine attributes agree that knowledge and power are both affirmed of Allah in a manner unlike their existence in created beings, without thereby denying the reality of what is affirmed or likening it to anything created, then the same applies when they say concerning these attributes: “We affirm them in a manner unlike their existence in created beings”; or that there is no difference between affirming what is an accident in us, without its resembling accidents, and affirming what is a body in us, without its resembling bodies.

Indeed, it may be said: It is well known and agreed upon among Muslims that Allah is living, knowing, and powerful, although He is not one of the living, knowing, and powerful beings. Likewise, those who affirm the divine attributes do not disagree that He exists, although He is unlike all other existing things. Indeed, sound reason requires the existence of a necessary, beginningless being, and requires that this being be unlike a temporally originated, contingent being. Otherwise, whatever is possible for a temporally originated being would necessarily be possible for the necessary being. Thus, reason’s first principles establish that there is a necessarily existent being and that He is unlike a contingently existent being. What they affirm concerning all the known attributes is of the same order as what they affirm concerning the divine essence. This is evident upon the slightest reflection and is known through sound reason. What is reported of them in this regard is therefore nothing but the like of what rational people agree upon, and what is established and known through sound reason.

If he says that the other groups disagree among themselves on this, he is told: The Hanbalīs also disagree among themselves. Some deny these attributes and require figurative interpretation of the texts, while others permit figurative interpretation,