and other groups of theologians, including the Murji’ah, the Shī‘ah, and others, affirm these attributes known through revelation, while the remaining proponents of the divine attributes who deny these particular attributes affirm those they call rationally known attributes, such as life, knowledge, and power. Some of these proponents, however, also regard the attributes known through revelation as qualitative attributes subsisting in the one described, just like the rationally known attributes. They distinguish between the two only because of the different ways in which they are known: the latter are known through reason as well as truthful revelation, whereas the former are known only through revelation.

As for the early generations, the leading authorities, the hadith scholars, the leading jurists and Sufis, and certain groups of theologians, they do not say that these attributes belong to the same category as those. Nor do they call them attributes known through revelation, since some qualitative attributes, too, are known only through revelation; thus, in their view, this does not distinguish them. Some of them say that these attributes are also known through reason.

On either view, regardless of whether they are concrete [أ] and qualitative attributes, it may be said: It is well known that, in our case, existing things are either bodies, such as the face