the inward to the outward, just as the judgment pertaining to outward sensation passes to the inward. If the soul is supposed to exist without a body, it still senses the pleasure and pain it experiences. This, together with the kinds of causes that produce it, is something perceptible to the soul, not an abstract, universal intelligible. The latter exists only in knowledge and belief and must have individual instances existing in external reality; otherwise, it would not be true. It is well known that the supposition that the soul takes pleasure in these things without perceiving external realities is among the most unsound suppositions.

It is like saying:

“The soul takes pleasure in imagining what is sensed and desired, without directly experiencing its external reality.”

Thus, their statement, “The intelligible is represented in the form of the sensible,” has no substance.

But if someone were to say, “What is absent is represented in the form of what is present, and the unseen in the form of the seen,” this would be true. A person knows what he witnesses and senses only through analogy and comparison with what he has witnessed. Yet this does not imply that the absent things thus represented are not themselves perceptible, but are apprehended through purely abstract intellection. No one who understands what he is saying would maintain this.

The thirty-fifth argument:

It may be said that the Companions, the Successors, all the other early generations and leading authorities of the Muslim community, the leading hadith scholars, the jurists, the Sufis, and the theologians who affirm the divine attributes among the Kullābiyyah, Karrāmiyyah, and Ash'ariyyah,