or sense perception, or conjecture or imagination, or any kind of perception. Singling out conjecture and imagination in this regard suggests that conjecture and imagination can fathom its true nature, that they distinguish between the two, and that one must distinguish between conjecture and imagination fathoming its true nature and knowledge and reason doing so. All of this is mistaken.

The Twenty-Ninth Point

If there is no difference between conjecture and imagination, sense perception, and knowledge and reason with respect to apprehending His true nature, then nothing of what you seek to establish follows. What you seek to establish is that one must acknowledge the existence of something contrary to the judgment of sense perception and imagination. Yet in what has been mentioned, there is no difference between sense perception and imagination on the one hand, and reason on the other. None of these can determine how His essence is. Denying that His essence can be fully fathomed does not entail denying that He can be known through these faculties, just as it does not entail denying that He can be known through knowledge and reason.

For, with regard to his statement:

“They must acknowledge that the distinctive nature of His essence, by which it is distinguished from all other essences, is something whose true nature conjecture and imagination cannot fathom. This is an acknowledgment of the existence of something contrary to what conjecture judges and imagination determines”

—for which, moreover, he has offered no proof—there is no difference between conjecture and imagination on the one hand, and sense perception, reason, and knowledge on the other, since none of these can fathom His true nature. And if