“body”—on the same footing, let alone according to someone who says, “By it I mean that which subsists in itself and has no need of a substrate,” even if, in his view, every self-subsisting thing is separate from other things, bears attributes, and cannot be pointed to as being here or there—which is what someone else means by the term “body.” Yet none of this entails that the distinction between the Creator and His creatures resembles the distinction between the celestial sphere and the elements, namely, not being susceptible to rupture.

Rather, this is like saying: “If He subsists in Himself, He is equal to all other self-subsisting things—the heavens and the earth, animals, trees, and plants. The most anyone can say in this regard is that these self-subsisting things admit of separation and dissolution, whereas He does not.” Or saying: “If He possesses life, knowledge, power, hearing, and sight, He is equal to every human, angel, and jinn described by these attributes. The most that can be said here is that these attributes may cease to inhere in their bearer, whereas those attributes cannot cease to inhere in theirs.”

On the contrary, the fact that bodies, self-subsisting things, and created beings share these general characteristics does not entail that they share the same essential natures. Rather, each of these kinds has its own essential nature and attributes, through which it is far more distinct from and unlike the others than it is similar to them. This has already been explained when we demonstrated the error of those who maintain that bodies are alike in their essential nature and that, because they share in