that the essence in question cannot exist, or cannot be conceived as existing, except in this manner, then this is something we accept.

The fifteenth argument: This consequence applies to all the descendants of Adam and to everyone who acknowledges the existence of anything whatsoever. For within what exists, one thing must be distinguishable from another. As for the Necessary Existent, distinction is even more evident in Him, since He is more perfect and complete. He must therefore be distinguished from other existing things by the distinctiveness of His necessarily existent essence, while sharing with them existence in its general sense.

This affirms two meanings, one of which can be known without the other being known. Either one is negated on the assumption that the other is absent, or it is not negated. If it is not negated, one must be identical with the other, which is impossible. Even if that were admissible, it would also be admissible in the analogous case. There would thus be no difference between making one of two realities distinguished in the mind identical with the other, and making one of several distinct spatial regions identical with another. And if it is not negated, composition from two or more attributes necessarily follows. The same applies to His being an intellective subject, an object of intellection, and intellect, exercising providence, being an agent and a necessitating cause of what is other than Himself, and to all the other