and “voluntary” and “inferential.” Those who hold the former view say that all knowledge is ultimately necessary. This is true, and the disagreement is merely verbal. They apply this only to true knowledge, on the premise that a person cannot be compelled to hold an untrue belief. This is correct where the innate disposition is sound, for it is naturally constituted with sound perception and will. But when the innate disposition is altered, a person may be subjected to a corrupt compulsion, such as faulty sensation, and may also be compelled to will corruptly, as the Quran indicates.

The twelfth argument concerns his statement: “Either nothing of that which is pointed to remains on its six sides, or something remains.”

He should be told: Those whose disagreement is substantive say, “One may neither say that something of it remains nor that nothing of it remains, because whether anything remains or not presupposes that it is composite and divisible. If we suppose that it subsists in itself, can be pointed to through sense perception, and is not composite, one may not say that anything remains or that nothing remains.” This is their position at the first stage of the argument.

If he says, “This contradicts sense perception or necessary knowledge,” this should not be denied, for denying it would be false, of the same kind as