of clear rational truth. If each group maintains that the other’s position entails contradicting necessary knowledge and clear rational truth, then this dispute is not purely verbal. Nor does it concern everything denoted by “body” and “self-subsistent,” but only part of what they denote.

For one group agrees with the other in denying some of what “body” denotes—namely, composition and compounding. It does not, however, agree with the other in denying directional separateness or in denying that He must be either co-located or separate.

As regards the expression “self-subsistent,” both sides agree on His independence of all else and His having no need of anything else—that is, the necessity of His existence. But they do not agree on denying His directional separateness or denying that a self-subsistent entity must be distinct from another self-subsistent entity in some respect other than essential nature and time. Rather, those who reject these denials hold that every self-subsistent entity must be distinct from another self-subsistent entity in a respect other than essential nature and time. For distinctions in essential nature and time, and the differences attendant upon these, arise both between an entity that subsists in itself and one that subsists in something else, and between two entities that subsist in things other than themselves.

It is thus clear that those who define “body” as something self-subsistent, without making compounding part of the definition, agree with the others in denying some, but not all, of what “body” denotes in the latter’s usage; that the others agree with them in affirming some, but not all, of what “self-subsistent” denotes; and that the former