perceptible things, and even without considering their existence. Rather, these possibilities are known to be excluded because He is known to be eternal, necessarily existent in Himself, Ever-Living, and the Self-Subsisting Sustainer. For whatever is self-subsisting and necessarily existent in itself cannot have an essence susceptible to nonexistence. An essence susceptible to nonexistence admits both nonexistence and existence; if it were [not] possible, admitting of no existence, it would be impossible. Neither what is intrinsically contingent nor what is intrinsically impossible can be intrinsically necessary.

Likewise, if He were susceptible to separation, illness, or similar changes and transformations that are precursors and causes of nonexistence and extinction, He would not be Ever-Living, the Self-Subsisting Sustainer, the Self-Sufficient, and necessarily existent in Himself. For these things entail the loss and nonexistence of something included in what is designated by His essence, whether an attribute or a part of Him. Were that to cease to exist, His essence would not be necessarily existent; rather, something belonging to His essence would not be necessarily existent. This would then entail that nothing of His essence is necessarily existent, since there is no distinction between one thing and another in this respect. Hence, admitting that such things are possible for Him entails admitting the possibility of His nonexistence, for whatever is susceptible to