or His Messenger, or in the words of the early generations of the Muslim community and its leading scholars, and the most any of them can do is infer this—as al-Rāzī did in discussing scriptural proofs—then anyone who examines those proofs knows that they do not yield even a weak presumption, let alone a strong one, much less certain knowledge. Rather, we have already shown that every proof he adduced supports the opposite of his intended conclusion more strongly than it supports that conclusion.

If this is so, and we assume that negating these concepts is correct, then one who practises dissimulation and acts out of fear in dealing with these negators is in a better position and held in greater esteem by people of knowledge and faith than al-Rāzī’s party of negators are when they do the same. For the latter practise dissimulation before people of knowledge and faith. This is the condition of the hypocrites whom Allah has mentioned and condemned in the Quran in as many passages as He willed.

This is clear and evident. The error of these people—if it is indeed established to be an error—concerns something claimed to be rational, not what the Messenger brought. Such a person practises dissimulation before those who lay claim to rational knowledge, not before the people of faith and the Quran. What comparison is there between someone who practises dissimulation before those men of reason and kings who are in the right, and someone who practises dissimulation and hypocrisy towards the prophets and messengers and their rightly guided successors?

All of this assumes that he is mistaken, inwardly holding an erroneous belief. But if what he holds inwardly is correct, then their saying with their tongues what is contrary to what is in