attributes, nor does it entail that. That is not the case; rather, equality in any attribute one might posit entails an impossibility and the conjunction of two contradictories. As for the attributes mentioned here, declaring Him free of them does not require denying His equality with all other essences in that respect. Rather, these attributes are excluded from Him independently of any consideration of likening or equating Him to creation. Death, illness, and other such things are not denied of Him merely because they entail such likeness or equivalence.

Thus, if one were to say:

“If these attributes were possible for Him, He would necessarily depend upon another creator, because they entail nonexistence and the possibility of nonexistence,”

this would be a sound argument, without saying:

“If His essence were equal to all other essences in these attributes.”

This argument is like saying:

“If His essence were equal to an ignorant and incapable essence in incapacity and ignorance, it would be impossible for Him to create the world,”

or something similar. Introducing equality and likeness into such an argument is therefore a grave error. For once these deficiencies are considered together with the premise on which the argument depends, He must be declared free of them in every degree, great or small, because He must possess their opposites, on account of the resemblance to those essences that this entails. Rather, declaring Him free of equality with those essences gives the impression that He