solidity. Any accident of which a body can be free together with its opposite is not, in his view, a part of that body; examples are power, pain, knowledge, and ignorance.

He holds that these accidents cannot come together and become bodies after they have come into existence. It is impossible for this to be done to them except at their inception, since they come into existence only in combination. In his view, they may all be together while existing, but it is impossible for them all to separate while continuing to exist. For if they separated while continuing to exist, colour would exist without anything coloured, and life without anything living.

If you say to him, “Then, on this reasoning, they cannot separate,” he sometimes replies, “Their separation is their ceasing to exist,” and at other times, “Two bodies may separate, but not the parts of a body while they continue to exist.” He also allows that part of a body may cease to exist while the body itself remains in existence, provided that the opposite of that part is put in its place.

These views thus come down to several positions. The first is that a body is that which can bear attributes and accidents, even if it is not composite. The second is that it is that which admits of composition from parts. According to the six positions, either a single part is called a body when incorporated into a composite, or a body requires two parts, six, eight, or thirty-six, or no fixed number is stipulated.