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In his second reply to the argument from impossibility—namely, that it is impossible for Him to be neither within the world nor outside it, just as it is impossible for Him to be neither coexistent with the world nor prior to it, neither eternal nor originated—al-Rāzī says:

“Moreover, reason refuses to admit an existent in one direction that cannot be described as equal to, smaller than, or greater than an existent in another direction. Yet you do not allow it to be said that the Creator is equal to the Throne or greater than it, and you do not allow it to be said that the Creator is equal to the Throne, greater than it, or smaller than it. If they accept this, they must concede that His essence is divisible.”

This may be answered in several ways. First, one may say to him: This is an analogical reply intended to hold an opponent to the implications of his own position. Yet you yourself established at the beginning of your Nihāya that such reasoning is invalid, of no use in inquiry, and inadmissible in debate, as has already been noted in similar cases more than once.