their assertion that whatever subsists in itself must be separate in direction from anything else that subsists in itself; their assertion that when one thing subsisting in itself is separate from another such thing, their separation cannot be merely one of essence and time, but must involve something additional, which can only be direction; and their assertion that whatever subsists in itself must either be in contact with something else or separate from it.

They also state that an existing thing either subsists in itself or subsists in another—this is agreed upon. It is either separate from another or co-located with it, either inside another or outside it; and it is distinct from another in essence, place, or time. These and similar arguments are, in their view, rational demonstrations by which they establish that He is separate from creation and above it, and that this is necessarily so.

As for how they establish the impossibility of what the negators maintain, one example is their statement that it is self-evidently impossible to affirm an existing thing that is neither separate from another nor co-located with it. This amounts to affirming something that neither subsists in itself nor subsists in another. The same applies to the statement, “neither inside the world nor outside it.” Accordingly, whoever defines substance as what subsists in itself and accident as what subsists in another, yet claims that there exists something that is neither a substance nor an accident, has made a claim whose falsity is self-evident.

They further say that whatever necessarily holds true of what subsists in itself, or of what exists—namely, that it must be separate from anything else, which excludes being co-located with it or being within it—applies all the more to Allah. For Allah Most High is the Self-Subsisting Sustainer, the Self-Sufficient; thus, whatever self-subsistence and self-sufficiency necessarily entail applies all the more to Him.

They also say that, regarding what is impossible for an existing thing—namely, its neither subsisting in itself nor subsisting in another, its being neither co-located with another nor separate from it, or its being neither inside the world nor outside it—what is ruled out is only that which is incompatible