all the conditions required to bring it about either have been present from eternity or have not. If they have, it must itself be eternal, contrary to what is observed. If they have not been present from eternity, then their subsequent occurrence is subject to the same argument as that originated event. An infinite regress follows, so those conditions could not arise thereafter. These originated events would therefore be impossible, contrary to what is observed. Thus, consistently applying this argument, with which they seek to intimidate others, commits them either to the eternity of all existing things or to the nonexistence of all effects. Once both eternity and nonexistence have been disproved, it becomes clear that they have lost their footing.

The second way is to say: These things, originated as they are, together with the celestial spheres, stars, and elements alleged to be eternal, have particular features in their dimensions, attributes, spatial locations, and movements that none but Allah Most High can enumerate. The cause determining these particulars either necessitates its effects by its very essence, without any capacity to determine particulars, or it does not. If it necessitates its effects by its very essence, then, according to their claim, it contains no differentiation; rather, it is one in every respect. Sound reason attests that something of this kind cannot distinguish one thing from another by assigning it a particular attribute or magnitude, nor apprehend one entity as having a particular attribute rather than another.

If, however, the agent responsible for this is capable of determining particulars, then it assigns originated events their particular times just as it assigns them their particular spatial locations, attributes, and magnitudes. Indeed, the matter of time is more particular than the others. Whatever excuse they offer—for example, saying, “Nothing else is possible,” or “Anything other than this