—distinct from others in its reality and different from all else in its essence—has, if it is said to require a necessitating cause, no such cause other than the essence itself. Thus, the essence itself necessitates its being as it is, and its existence as it is is necessary by virtue of itself, not anything else. If it is said that it has no necessitating cause, meaning that this reality and particularity have no necessitating cause separate from them, that too is correct.

The point is simply that this particular reality is necessarily existent in itself; no cause separate from it may be sought. Indeed, seeking such a cause amounts to denying what exists necessarily in itself. Denying necessary existence entails denying everything that exists, since whatever exists is either necessary or contingent, and the contingent requires a necessary existent. There must therefore be something necessarily existent.

And if denying the particularity that is necessary in itself entails denying the necessarily existent, and denying