If He must be such as to necessitate the existence of the world as it is, yet this can be in a manner in which He is more perfect than in another, then anyone who maintains that He is characterized by the less perfect rather than the more perfect manner is among the most ignorant and unjust of people—especially if he claims that the more perfect manner is impossible and the less perfect one necessary.

The ninth point: There is no doubt that His essence has a distinctive characteristic by which it is distinguished from all other essences. For absolute existence, which is not particular to any one thing rather than another, exists, according to them, only in the mind, not in external reality. It is what existent things have in common. By common agreement, the absolute conditioned by absoluteness has no existence in external reality. Likewise, by common agreement, the absolute considered without stipulation does not exist in external reality as an absolute.

Yet philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā contradict themselves on this point: they identify necessary existence with absolute existence conditioned by absoluteness, while identifying that which is divided into the necessary and the contingent—which, according to them, is the subject matter of metaphysics—with absolute existence considered without stipulation. They have been joined in this contradiction by the adherents of the unity of existence, such as Ibn 'Arabī, Ibn Sab'īn, and others like them