from its particular configurations, dimensions, attributes, and diverse pairs, as He says:

“And of all things We created two mates; perhaps you will remember.” {49} [al-Dhāriyāt 49]

For if the Originator of the world is an intrinsically necessitating cause, one and simple, then, according to their own principle, different things cannot proceed from Him. If He is not such a cause, then He brings about whichever effects He chooses through His will and choice. It is therefore impossible to say that motion is what necessitates events, for events arise from a motion only in conjunction with the other, differing motions: the motions of the celestial spheres differ, just as the spheres themselves differ.

It is known that the motion of the ninth sphere does not necessitate the motion that follows it in the eighth. If it is said that it necessitates the motion accompanying it—since the eighth sphere and the other spheres each have a motion peculiar to themselves and another motion following that of the ninth—then the motions are nevertheless different, and the moving bodies are different. Different effects entail different causes, since a cause that is one in every respect does not necessitate two different effects. Nor can this difference be attributed to the recipients, for the argument concerning different recipients is the same as that concerning different motions. These diverse factors—the agent and the recipients—cannot proceed from a single cause. They must therefore proceed from a living agent possessed of attributes and a will by which He acts.

This contradicts their assertion that He is one and that only one thing proceeds from Him. For concerning this One whom they affirm, while denying Him attributes and magnitude, which they call composition and multiplicity, it has been demonstrated elsewhere in many ways