and other such matters, which this is not the place to discuss. Those philosophers associated partners with Allah and set up equals to Him by likening Him to created causes that necessitate their effects by their very essence. These others were less mistaken: in setting up equals to Him and associating partners with Him, they likened Him to created beings that act by choice.

Even if the property attributed to the original case were established, either group’s analogy would be among the most invalid analogies, since it equates the Lord of all worlds with some of His creatures. How much worse, then, when that property is absent from both original cases! For those people likened Him to an agent possessing power and choice who gives preference to one of two equivalent alternatives over the other, acting if he wills and refraining if he wills. Yet no created agent possessing power and choice is actually like this. Every such agent acts only once he has a firm will directed toward a particular intended object, and that will is brought about within him by another. This is better in certain respects.

Allah Most High—to whom belongs the highest description—is not like this. Rather, He acts independently through His will, which He has not acquired from another—from another—and He is not compelled to act. Neither His action nor His will itself compels Him. Rather, both of these characterize human beings, though the Qadariyyah deny this.

As for whatever is said to necessitate its effect by its very essence among