those who face the qiblah. His defense of this principle was among the best—or the very best—of his defenses of the doctrines of Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l-Jamāʿah.

As for those who distinguish between a cause that necessitates by its very essence and an agent acting by choice, in both the observable and unseen realms, their distinction is invalid. In the observable realm, when an agent acting by choice has a decisive will together with complete power, it stands on the same footing as a cause that necessitates by its very essence and may be called such. A cause that necessitates by its very essence does so only through an inherent natural attribute analogous to choice in an agent that chooses. Each possesses a power through which it acts, and each has an impetus and inclination toward action. In both cases, this is called a nature or an instinct: the innate disposition of a living being is called its nature, just as the corresponding quality in inanimate things is called theirs.

The difference between them, however, is that awareness exists in one but not the other, and awareness entails pleasure and pain. Hence they are distinguished by calling one a will but not the other, although the latter may also be called a will, as in the words of Allah Most High:

“a wall that wanted to collapse” [al-Kahf 77].

The first to introduce this distinction into Islam were the Qadarites. They went to extremes in affirming agency for living beings endowed with power, to the point of making the human being independent in what he does and excluding his actions from being created by Allah, subject to His power, or willed