because he wills it. Will itself favors one of the two acts within his power over the other. This is an intrinsic attribute of will and cannot be explained by anything external to it. This is the distinctive property of will: just as the distinctive property of power is that it enables one to act, and that of knowledge is that it enables one to know, so the distinctive property of will is that it singles out one possible act rather than another.

Some said that an agent’s favoring one alternative through his will must itself require a further determination. Others cited knowledge as the determining factor; others, the beneficence involved in the act; and others, power, namely, that it had been impossible.

The purpose here is to address those who accepted what they said concerning a determining factor that necessitates by its very essence, but denied it concerning an agent endowed with power and choice. The correct distinction, then, is between Allah and all others, not between a cause that necessitates by its very essence and an agent acting by choice. They should therefore be told: what they have described is impossible with respect to Allah Most High in every way. Nothing in existence necessitates by its very essence such that its effect must coexist