a relation of priority and posteriority. This is a mistake; rather, it is simply itself. The dependence of two on one and of three on two is the dependence of a whole on some of its constituent units. It is like a thing’s dependence on itself, as when two depends on two, or three on three. If the whole is nothing but these units and their composition, then what depends is not distinct from that on which it depends, and nothing in external reality precedes anything else in any respect—unless one exists before the other, in which case the ordering is temporal, and this is real. The mind, however, may apprehend the individual before the whole, the simple before the composite, and one before number; we may also express them in that order. The ordering thus lies in our knowledge and speech, not in reality itself. This is the priority by virtue of being a condition that they posit in numbers, magnitudes, composites, and the like.

The same applies to attributes and qualities. If it is said that knowledge and power are conditional upon life, and that a condition precedes what is conditioned by it, there is nevertheless no ordering whatsoever within the entity possessing these attributes. Rather, life, knowledge, and power exist together in every respect. Knowledge, however, entails the existence of life: it exists only together with life, not only after it. If it exists only together with life, whether life preceded it or not, this does not entail that it must be subsequent to life. Rather, if it is concurrent with life, then it is concurrent with it.

If life without knowledge is posited, and knowledge then comes to accompany it, knowledge is, in this case, also temporally subsequent to life. We do not dispute that temporal ordering can occur among attributes, just as it can among numbers, as explained above. But this is not necessary, and whenever