impossible, this is because, if the Creator’s precedence over the world were temporal, it would follow that the Creator would be time and that time would be temporal. As for the first consequence, time is an attendant of change, which is impossible for the Creator. As for the second, an infinite regress is impossible. As for its invalidating our opponent’s position, if the Creator’s precedence over the world were temporal, while Allah—glorified is He—has no beginning to His precedence over the world, it would follow that time has no beginning. Time would therefore be eternal; and since time is part of the world, the world would not have been brought into existence, contrary to our opponent’s claim.”

They may also use this argument to establish the impossibility of the world’s being preceded by nonexistence: the precedence of nonexistence over it cannot fall under the other four kinds, while, if it were temporal, time would necessarily be eternal.

They have used this reasoning to mislead people, so that many of the world’s keen minds have become confused on this point. Those Muslim theologians who have answered it have done so by affirming another kind of precedence outside these five categories, like the precedence of some parts of time over others and the Creator’s precedence over daily occurrences. Some of them, such as al-Shahrastānī and others, may call this precedence