there is mutual implication between them.

The seventh response is to say: We do not concede that sound reason does not reject this division once its meaning has been clarified and its ambiguity removed. For “space” may mean an existent entity separate from what occupies it; alternatively, it may mean that which is not separate from what occupies it and does not entail the existence of anything else. The occupation of space by the world and by other bodies does not entail the existence of anything else.

In short, if “that which occupies space” means something that entails the existence of something else, we do not dispute the division he has mentioned. Reason knows that an existent may occupy a space separate from itself, or it may not. But this does not undermine the disputant’s position, for he claimed only necessary knowledge that an existent is neither within the world nor outside it; he did not mention that which occupies space.

Likewise, if “that which occupies space” means only a body, excluding an accident, it is known that existing things include bodies and attributes that subsist in them, although this is disputed. Some people maintain that nothing exists except bodies. Such a person disputes this division and says: “I do not concede that sound reason does not reject dividing existing things into those that occupy space and those that do not.”

However, the aim is not merely to argue from these people’s standpoint, but to present a general argument, since there is no need to invoke these views. Thus, if by “that which is located in space” he means whatever occupies space, whether in its own right or derivatively, and does not specify that “space” is an existent entity separate from it, his disputant will not concede that sound reason does not reject dividing existing things into those located in space and those not located in it—not in the sense that reason knows this to be possible in external reality, as explained above