claim that what his opponent possesses is not necessary knowledge, without saying, “I know necessarily that this is impossible.” Thus, the most he can do is deny necessary knowledge. Yet if some people are compelled to have such knowledge while others are not, this would not refute what the former possess. For if certain people may possess necessary knowledge unavailable to others—just as they may possess inferential knowledge, knowledge of mass-transmitted reports and reported matters, and knowledge of subtle matters unavailable to others—and this is the more correct of the two views, then others’ lack of that knowledge does not undermine theirs.

If, on the other hand, it is held that all people must share in every instance of necessary knowledge, as one group of speculative theologians maintains, then, when one group says, “We are compelled to know this,” and another says, “We are not compelled to know it,” accepting one group’s statement would be no more justified than accepting the other’s, except on independent grounds. On this supposition, the necessary knowledge cited by the opponent would not be refuted by denying it in the disputed case, even had the disputant done so. How, then, could it be refuted when he has mentioned this only in connection with some other necessary knowledge?

This is reinforced by the fifth argument: this scenario, which he claims sound reason does not reject, either entails the possibility of what his opponent considers impossible, or it does not. If it does not entail that possibility, it is no answer at all. If it does, the most he has done is challenge what