in itself. By its innate disposition and immediate apprehension, reason knows that, of two existing things, one must either be inside the other or outside it, either above it or not above it, and either co-located with it, sharing its spatial region—rather, separate from its spatial region. All this knowledge is firmly established in the innate disposition. The statement, “Reason does not reject dividing existing things into those that occupy a spatial region and those that do not,” is not analogous to this, either in wording or in meaning. It therefore does not refute what is known self-evidently. Accordingly, there is no need for analogy or illustration.

This becomes clear through the fourth argument, which is as follows: When someone says, “I cannot conceive of an existing thing that is neither eternal nor has come into being,” or, “I cannot conceive of an existing thing that is neither inside another existing thing nor outside it, neither separate from it nor co-located with it,” he does not mean, “I do not know or understand this,” or, “I am incapable of conceiving of it or knowing it.” A person’s not knowing or conceiving of something, or being incapable of conceiving of it or knowing it, does not establish that it does not exist or that it is impossible. Indeed, among existing things are countless things—known in their entirety only to Allah—that many human beings neither know nor are capable of knowing.

Rather, when someone says, “This is inconceivable,” he means that its existence cannot conceivably be apprehended or known; that is, it is impossible to conceive of its existence or to know that it exists. Whatever cannot possibly be conceived of as existing, or known to exist, is impossible in itself. This is like the saying of the Most High:

“Say, ‘Do you inform Allah of something He does not know in the heavens or on the earth?’” [Yūnus 18]

That is, of something that does not exist, for if it