We discussed something similar at the beginning of this fair adjudication between him and his opponent, in which we disentangled the truth from the falsehood with which it had become confused in his Ta’sīs. Here, however, we have addressed what he mentioned in his Nihāyah.

Our discussion has shown that he proceeded by positing space and time. In one case, he mentioned concomitance with it and divided existing things into those concomitant with it and those not concomitant with it. In the other, he mentioned concomitance with it in both categories, but completed the division by distinguishing unrestricted from restricted concomitance. This is neither an equitable comparison, nor a sound analogy, nor a correspondence that holds in both cases. Rather, it is an invalid, unfair, and unjust analogy. Each must instead be weighed and compared with its counterpart. There would then be two types in each of the two classes, making four in total, as we have explained.

The third point is that examples and analogies are sometimes drawn because a thing’s ruling is obscure and becomes clear through an analogy, whether the analogy serves to clarify its conception or establish its truth. At other times, the matter is itself clear, self-evident, and manifest to an uncorrupted natural disposition, but some conjecture or desire in the heart prevents it from recognizing the matter itself. An example is therefore given in which there is no opposition to