reason. Nor did the Jahmiyyah who said that He is within the world, neither touching it nor separate from it, dispute this with him. Al-Rāzī and others like him may concede that those people’s claim is necessarily known by reason to be false; yet his own claim is even more plainly false according to the same necessary judgment of reason, as previously noted. For an accident inhering in a substance neither touches it nor is separate from it, whereas no substance or accident exists without either being separate from another or sharing its locus.

Thus, each of the two groups of Jahmiyyah agrees with the wider community that the other group’s position contradicts the necessary judgment of reason. In reality, the positions of both groups contradict it. These people’s statement, “The existent being that is separate from the world is neither within the world nor outside it,” or their statement, “The existent being is neither within the world nor outside it,” is like their brethren’s statement that He is within the world, neither separate from it nor touching it. If the assertion of the one group is necessarily known to be false, so too is that of the other; otherwise, no distinction can be drawn between them. Indeed, their assertion is more plainly false, as explained previously: an existent being is known that neither touches another existent being nor is separate from it, but no existent being is known that is neither separate from another nor shares its locus.

The same applies to the heretics’ statement that He is an existent being who is neither living nor dead, neither knowing nor ignorant, neither capable nor incapable, and similar assertions. The falsity of these claims is known by the necessity of