the existence of an existent that neither inheres in the world nor is separate from it.

Al-Rāzī said:

“Some opponents claim that the invalidity of these premises is self-evident. They say: ‘It is necessarily known that, of any two existents, one must either inhere in the other or be separate from it, occupying one of the six directions surrounding it.’ They say: ‘Affirming two existents outside these seven categories is invalid according to the immediate judgment of reason.’”

I say:

What these people claim is that, of any two existents, one must either inhere in the other or be separate from it. This entails its being specifically related to the other’s individual entity. They need not say that it must occupy one of the six directions surrounding it, except on the premise that every existent must have six directions. This, however, is not something known, nor is there