dependent upon them, and they would rival Him and be incompatible with His oneness, necessary existence, and beginninglessness. If a group among them then says that all created things inhere and subsist in Him, the inconsistency and contradiction of this claim—besides the unbelief and misguidance it entails—would be beyond description.

Likewise, they say that He cannot be above the Throne, lest He inhere in something else, subsist in something else, be in every place, or the like—even though He is distinct from the Throne and separate from it. If they then say that He inheres in created things and is mingled with filth, this would be among the greatest contradictions, besides the unbelief and misguidance it entails.

The point is that whenever these Jahmīs flee from some truth because of what they imagine to be an objection, they fall into falsehood many times greater, which necessarily entails the very consequence they consider objectionable. Thus, they are perpetually contradicting themselves. For everyone who denies that Allah is above the Throne must advance an argument that entails negation and denial. Yet, whether he asserts co-location or separation without co-location, he affirms everything he has negated, and many times more—or is necessarily committed to doing so. They have therefore gained nothing but contradiction in their assertions, and have denied the Creator. This is among the gravest forms of misguidance.

The mere contradiction between the two claims establishes the falsity of this position; how much more so when the further considerations are added? For if they say that the necessarily existent can only be one, and that it is not