are greater in unbelief and further astray than those who say that Allah Most High is, in His very Essence, in every place, and who hold the other repugnant views mentioned earlier. Yet they share the same fundamental doctrine, while exceeding them in misguidance.

The point here is to draw attention to the fact that those Jahmīs who do not affirm that the Lord is separate from the world are compelled to make Him dependent upon it if they maintain that He inheres in it, while the world has no need of Him. If, instead, they make Him the substratum in which the world inheres—while maintaining, as they do, that His Essence is not separate from the essence of the world but occupies the same locus—then they are saying that the Lord exists only through the existence of the world, and that He cannot exist without it. This is just as a substratum, whether substance or matter, cannot exist without the accidents or form that inhere in it. The world would thus be constitutive of the Lord’s existence, and the Lord would likewise be dependent upon it. This is more grievous than holding that the entire world has existed from eternity.

The thirteenth argument: These Jahmīs say that attributes neither inhere in Him nor subsist in Him. For if attributes and accidents subsisted in Him, He would be