deny co-location, while others do not deny it but affirm co-location with the world. Whoever denies co-location with the world must affirm spatial separation; otherwise, he combines two contradictories. As explained earlier, he cannot deny co-location while also denying spatial separation. Whoever affirms co-location does not regard Him as spatially separate from the world; at most, he regards Him as distinct from the world in reality and time. Yet this distinction also holds between a substance and its accident. We know self-evidently that Allah’s distinction from created things is greater than the distinction between created things themselves, or between a substance and an accident. Thus, every one of these people must deny what is rationally self-evident.

The tenth argument: All these people have, by their own claim, sought to avoid likening Him to creation. Yet it is well known that their position involves likening Him to everything—to substances and bodies, and even to nonexistent things—in ways not found in the position of those who adhere to the natural disposition and revealed law. For the denial of both spatial separation and co-location describes something nonexistent, while affirming co-location likens Him to every substance: the one is co-located with the other despite differing from it in reality and time. Moreover, some of them hold that things inhere in Him, while others hold that He inheres in things. The former have thus likened Him to substances, and the latter have likened Him to accidents.