matters that are not positively existent, as would similar things. Denying these of Him would then be invalid, since everyone agrees that He may be described in negative terms.

Furthermore, if that were something not positively existent, its opposite would be positively existent and could not be an attribute of something nonexistent. Yet it is known that something nonexistent may be described as neither indwelling in anything else nor having anything else indwell in it. This rules out the cause of indwelling being positively existent and entails that indwelling itself is positively existent.

As for his statement, “If it were positively existent, the attribute would indwell in the thing, and indwelling would itself have an indwelling, which entails an infinite regress,” the response is: the first is the indwelling of something self-subsisting in something else; the second is the indwelling of an attribute in its subject. The former belongs to the category of bodies indwelling in their loci, while the latter belongs to the category of accidents indwelling in bodies. These two kinds are distinct. This does not entail that the indwelling of an attribute in its subject must itself have a further indwelling in it, since an accident does not subsist in another accident.