is the substrate would have a stronger claim to this, and the impossibility would recur. If that necessitating cause were neither a body nor corporeal, there would be no more reason for it to necessitate Allah’s indwelling in some substances than His indwelling in others. It would therefore follow that He indwells in all substances, and the impossibility would recur.

If, on the other hand, it were an agent acting by choice, that agent would necessarily have to perform an act; otherwise, there would be no difference in the indwelling entity before and after indwelling. That act would necessarily be either the indwelling itself or something that necessitates it. Yet one thing’s indwelling in another is not something positively existent such that it could be an agent’s effect or a necessitated result. For if one thing’s indwelling in another were an existent attribute, that attribute would itself indwell in the thing in which the first thing had come to indwell. The indwelling of that indwelling would then be additional to it, entailing an infinite regress.