and time, the separateness between Him and the world cannot consist merely in essence and time. For if His separateness from the world is greater than that of something separate from another in essence and time, it cannot be of the same kind.

This is clear: if His reality were separate only in essence and time, it would not be impossible for either of the two to inhere in the other, or for both to inhere in a single substrate. Indeed, the advocates of indwelling among the Jahmiyyah may say this. For if someone says, “The Creator is separate from the world, yet He inheres in it or serves as its substrate; His separateness from it consists in His being prior to it and in His essence differing from its essence, just as substance is separate from accident and accident from substance,” separateness in essence and time would not preclude such co-location. Thus, if co-location is ruled out, it is necessary