and the like, while affirming what necessarily entails it. There is no doubt that the rational proofs for affirmation, whether self-evident or inferential, are stronger than the arguments for negation. The deniers possess no self-evident proofs, and whatever rational syllogisms they advance, the affirmers possess stronger and more numerous ones. This is so even for someone unaware of the flaws in their syllogisms; whoever recognizes those flaws realizes that their arguments amount to intimidating rhetoric rather than substantive proof. As for scriptural proofs, those supporting the affirmers are many times more numerous, while the deniers possess nothing that yields even a probable conclusion.

Accordingly, if what the deniers call corporealism necessarily follows, the affirmers can accept it, with rational and scriptural proofs establishing it. The deniers, however, cannot maintain their denial without abandoning reason and revelation. Such is the condition of the people of the Fire, who said:

“If only we had listened or reasoned, we would not have been among the companions of the Blaze.” {10} [al-Mulk 10]

If it does not necessarily follow, there is no need to affirm it. Even if doubt about that entailment is set aside, and there are two views on whether the affirmer contradicts himself by denying corporeality, there is no doubt that the affirmer’s inconsistency is far less than the denier’s. His adherence to scriptural and rational proofs is greater, and his vindication of the innate disposition and the revealed law is clearer.

Since the error on his side is less, he must not turn instead to someone whose error is greater. Rather, the latter must agree with him on what he has right. If they then both return to the truth in full, so much the better; otherwise, increasing their share of truth is more fitting and more obligatory than increasing their share of error.