the rational methods of speculative theology they employ in discussing divinity are sound, then this method is one of them and thus constitutes an argument against them. If those methods are unsound, however, they provide no argument in their favor, just as they provide none against them. Their discourse would therefore have no greater claim to truth than that of their opponents, nor would the reasoning used to reject the self-evident truth cited by their opponents be sound.

The thirty-seventh point: Their opponents appeal to numerous scriptural proofs, to what they cite as rationally self-evident, and to the rational analogies they have presented. If rational analogies—if rational analogies of the kind previously mentioned are valid and admissible in this field, then the rational analogies their opponents present may be rejected only by demonstrating the invalidity of the particular analogy advanced, not merely because it reasons by analogy from the observed to the unobserved. If such analogies are rejected, then everything advanced by the proponents of negation must likewise be rejected.

The scriptural proofs would then remain free of any rational counterargument, invalidating their claim that these proofs conflict with decisive rational demonstrations. Reinterpreting them would consequently be ruled out, and their content would have to be accepted as true. Nor would there be any evidence invalidating what their opponents have cited as rationally self-evident. This is clear to anyone who reflects upon it, and it rests on justice and fairness. We have already drawn attention to this earlier, and to the fact that the foundation of their discourse in