or the syllogism that contains it. Although this, too, is among the syllogisms and illustrative analogies by which that is established, it should take the form of an a fortiori argument: if this small thing that has come into being must have an originator, then this great thing that has come into being has even greater need of one.

Moreover, we have never witnessed an originator in the full, absolute sense, for in reality there is no complete originator except Allah, glorified be He. Thus, those Muʿtazilites who suppose that one can know that what comes into being does not require an originator only by analogy with human acts of origination are mistaken. For the judgment applying to the original case is weaker than that applying to the inferred case. Even if, as they claim, a human being brings his actions into being, there is no doubt that, in what he builds and weaves, he depends upon an instrument external to his own power. He is therefore not a counterpart; the judgment applying to the inferred case is stronger and more fitting.

Likewise, the statement that neither of the two alternatives concerning a contingent thing can prevail over the other without a factor favoring it is a universal proposition whose import is that all contingent things