it is not called apprehension.

Second, a term is coined only for something known to the person coining it, and the Arabs conceived only of seeing something bounded. On our opponent’s view, this is because seeing in any other way is impossible. On our view, although seeing could occur otherwise, this was neither known to the Arabs nor conceived by them. Once this is established, it follows that they used apprehension only for seeing something situated in a direction. Our explanation thus establishes that if apprehension denoted seeing, it would denote seeing something finite. This is what the earlier scholars of our school meant when they said, “Apprehension means encompassing the object seen.”

Once it is established that apprehension denotes only a particular kind of seeing, negating apprehension does not entail negating seeing altogether, since negating the more specific does not entail negating the more general. As for his statement, “The Arabs make no distinction between seeing and apprehension,”