by analogy with that whose existence is known.

The fourth response is that, if this concerns an existent posited alongside the world, that existent must be either Allah or something other than Him. If it is something other than Him, it is known to be nonexistent, because anything whose existence is posited other than Allah belongs to the world. Thus, no existent other than Allah can be posited outside the totality of His creation. If this existent means Allah, then the meaning is that Allah must be either greater than the world, smaller than it, or equal to it in size. If this is the intended meaning, then using it to argue that the Creator falls into one of these categories is to prove something by means of itself, whereas the proof is distinct from what it establishes. The argument would amount to saying: the Lord who exists alongside the world must be either equal to it, greater than it, or smaller than it; and since this is so, He must be either equal to it, greater than it, or smaller than it. It is evident that this is invalid, let alone analogous to the argument under discussion.

What we have pointed out in discussing this argument also shows that matters are not as he claims when he says, “After thoroughly refining and formulating it, we raised these overwhelming questions and undermining objections against it.” For the argument has not been fully formulated as it should be, nor do the objections he mentions have the force he claims for them. This is so even though we ourselves have not exhaustively formulated the argument or answered his questions, since the purpose is to recount the argument as he presented it and to offer observations that point toward a fair judgment between him and his opponents.