in both matters, as in the analogous case discussed above. Thus, this is not a valid argument, whether in inquiry or in debate, for there is no agreement that this must be denied. Rather, most proponents of affirmation accept one of these categories.

The second response is that this division is invalid. Everything we observe is part of the world, whether it subsists independently or in something else. How, then, can something that is part of the world be said to be either equal to the world, greater than it, or smaller than it? It is known that it can only be smaller. Since it cannot be equal to the world or greater than it, it becomes clear that this is not analogous to the argument in question. That argument maintains that every existent must bear one of two relations to another: either co-location or separation. Existents thus fall into two categories: those co-located with others and those separate from them. But one cannot say that an observed existent must fall into one or another of these three categories: it must fall into one particular category, namely, being smaller.

The third response is that what he has mentioned concerns only something whose existence alongside the world is posited or supposed. It is known that what holds of something whose existence is merely posited or supposed cannot be known through sense perception or self-evidence in the same way as what holds of one observed, perceptible existent in relation to another observed, perceptible existent. For that argument rests on what is known through sense perception and necessity. One then considers whether the underlying reason encompasses necessary existence or is confined to what is other than it. As for hypothetical existents, what holds of them cannot be known through sense perception or necessity, but only