The third response is that those among the speculative theologians and philosophers who deny the existence of indivisible atoms, or suspend judgment concerning them, reject this classification into three categories. Many groups hold these positions.

The fourth response concerns his statement: “Whatever is spatially separate must be either an indivisible atom or composed of atoms, and the fact that every pair of existent things in the observable world falls under one of these three categories—an accident, an indivisible atom, or a composite body—must be accounted for by existence itself.” He may be answered as follows: That self-subsisting things in the observable world are composed of atoms, and that they are either indivisible atoms or composite bodies, is not known through sensory perception or self-evident knowledge, unlike the fact that an existent thing either subsists in itself or subsists in something else. Rather, people disagree greatly over this, some denying it, others affirming it, and others suspending judgment. Accordingly, this is not analogous to that argument.

The fifth response is that those speculative theologians and philosophers who maintain that a body is in itself a unity, not composed of atoms, dispute this classification, whether they hold that it can be divided down to an indivisible part or that it admits of endless division. They say, “We do not concede that something self-subsisting must be either composed of parts or an indivisible atom.” Many groups hold these positions.