based on holding an opponent to the implications of his own position. Such arguments constitute proof neither for someone investigating the matter nor for someone engaged in debate, as has been explained more than once. This argument either entails that every pair of existent things in the observable world falls under one of these categories, or it does not. If it does not, it poses no difficulty. If it does, then unless the person distinguishing between the two cases states a difference between them, it would constitute an argument against them in both cases. He could say, “I affirm bodies, substances and accidents only for such-and-such reasons.” If this constitutes a valid distinction, the argument intended to bind him fails. If it does not constitute a valid and adequate distinction, no judgment can be reached, since there is neither a scriptural text nor a general consensus on the matter.

The second response is that whether an existent thing in the observable world is an indivisible atom or not is neither directly observed nor known through sensory perception or self-evident knowledge. It is unlike knowing that an existent thing in the observable world is either separate from another or co-located with it. Rather, this is a matter of considerable disagreement among the speculative theologians. This founder himself is among those who suspend judgment concerning the existence of indivisible atoms. He has also reported such suspension of judgment from the thinkers he mentions among the keenest minds of the various schools, such as Abū al-Husayn al-Basrī and Abū al-Ma‘ālī al-Juwaynī. Since this is not known through sensory perception and necessary knowledge, it is not analogous to that argument.