respect, just as it is an argument against those others elsewhere. If they draw a distinction, then, if that distinction is valid, the counterexample involving body and accident fails. If the distinction is invalid, their denial of what the terms “body” and “accident” designate is itself invalid. In either case, this argument is not thereby invalidated.

The third response concerns his statement in the third objection: “Of any two existing things, one must either occupy the same place as the other or be separate from it in any direction whatsoever.” He carries the division through to its conclusion, namely, that He must either occupy the same place as the world or be separate from it in any direction whatsoever. This would mean that He is not exclusively above; indeed, it would entail the possibility of His Essence moving from above to below. All of this, according to those people, is impossible.

There are several answers to this. First, it is not true that, of any two existing things, one must either occupy the same place as the other or be separate from it in any direction whatsoever. Rather, some existing bodies, so long as they retain their essential nature, can only lie in one particular direction relative to another. Thus, a person’s head can only be above, and the sole of his foot can only be at the bottom. Were this changed, it would no longer retain its essential nature. Likewise, the Throne cannot be in the lowest depths, nor can the lowest depths be above the Throne.