that is both necessary and sufficient, just as existence is explained by visibility and by the necessity of co-location or separation.

As for his statement in the second argument, “Every existent in the observable realm is either a mass or something subsisting in a mass. We then pursue the classification to its conclusion, until it follows that the Creator must be either a mass or something subsisting in a mass, which these thinkers do not accept,” there are two replies.

The first is that, in ordinary usage, “mass” means a dense, cohesive thing, such as stone or earth, unlike air, which is not ordinarily called a mass. If this is what he means, then not every existent in the observable realm is either a mass or something subsisting in a mass. If, however, he means that every existent in the observable realm either subsists in itself or subsists in something that subsists in itself, then this holds equally in the unseen realm.

As for the contention that every existent in the observable realm is either a body or an accident, or either a substance or an accident, followed by the classification to its conclusion, the reply is: denying that Allah is a substance or an accident, in the specialized senses of these terms, is no part of the revealed Law, just as affirming these of Him is no part of