existent things and is absolute existence,” and the like.

As for the eighth question, he says by way of objection: “If existence were the basis for division into substance and accident, then substance alone would have to admit division into substance and accident, and likewise accident.”

The reply is that this is an obvious error and a glaring fallacy. The term “existent” here may mean a particular existent outside the mind. In that case, the meaning is that it must have one of two properties: either co-location or separation. It is not said to be divisible into these two. Accordingly, an existing substance must have one of these properties, and an existing accident must have one of them.

Alternatively, what is meant may be absolute, universal existence, which is what is divided into categories. To say that it is divided into what shares a locus and what is separate is like saying that it is divided into substance and accident. The fact that it admits division does not entail that either of its two divisions admits the same division as the whole. Rather, that would combine two contradictories.

As for his statement in the ninth question: “This argument applies in many cases even though the conclusion it entails is false. This shows that it is invalid. This can be demonstrated in several ways: